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This Article is dedicated to the memory of Marc Poirier, an inspiring 
author and a generous human being. 
 
The property as personhood theory provides a dominant justification for 
legal theory and has shaped numerous legal doctrines.  Although the theory has 
been criticized by many scholars, one important concern has escaped scholars 
thus far.  Property as personhood limits identity and confines growth.  The 
concept allows little room for experimenting with personality and testing one’s 
lifestyle.  Access, a rising form of property use in the sharing economy, provides 
an important alternative.  It allows for property use without personhood, 
emphasizing choice, flexibility and mobility.  This Article presents this 
alternative and explains its significance to property legal theory contra the 
property as personhood theory.  It also details the benefits and costs associated 
with property without personhood, and sketches out possible legal implications. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 772 
I. PROPERTY, PERSONHOOD AND STABILITY ................................. 775 
A. The Approach .............................................................. 775 
B. Personhood’s Critiques................................................ 779 
1. Psychological Validity ............................................ 779 
2. Pragmatism and Values ......................................... 780 
3. Relative Status ........................................................ 781 
4. Growth and Change .............................................. 782 
II. THE RISE OF ACCESS ................................................................ 783 
A. Access: Definition and Background ............................ 783 
B. Motivations for Access.................................................. 790 
C. Access: Property Without Personhood ....................... 791 
1. Access as Flexibility and Detachment ................... 791 
2. Critiques of Property without Personhood .......... 797 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law & Business, Ramat Gan; Visiting Scholar 
and Adjunct Professor, Cornell Law School.  For important feedback and suggestions, 
I am grateful to Greg Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Ronit Kedar, Hoi Kong, Aziz Rana, 
and Sarah Waldeck. 
KREICZER-LEVY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  3:27 PM 
772 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:771 
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ............................................................. 800 
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 807 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Property and personhood are intimately linked in modern legal 
thinking.1  Controlling property through possession manifests 
individuality.2  Possession contributes to self-development and 
manifests identity.3  Ownership connotes stability.4  Property is often 
justified based on its role in connecting a person to her past and future 
and communicating her identity.5  Our home, car, books, furniture, 
and even toys reflect who we are to our friends and neighbors.6 
Yet, alongside this description, property as shaping or reflecting 
identity comes at a price.  We stand the risk of fetishizing property and 
reducing our identity to mere items.7  We risk being judged by what we 
have rather than who we are.8  To these familiar critiques, this Article 
adds a neglected risk: property as personhood limits our options and 
 
 1 ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 34–38 (1995); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 352 
(reprinted 2002); Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 
(1982); Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to 
the Public Domain – With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1392, 1397–1406 (1993); Jeffery Douglas Jones, Property as Personhood 
Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 93 (2011); Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin 
Territory: Margaret Radin’s Imagery of Personal Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277 
(1998).  Cf. the analysis of cultural property in Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property 
Claim Within the Same Sex Marriage Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343 (2008). 
 2  G. W. F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1967); WALDRON, 
supra note 1.  See also Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 
56–57 (1983). 
 3  Radin, supra note 1.  
 4  See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 102 (2007). 
 5  See supra note 1. 
 6  Cf. Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L. 
REV. 61 (2015) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property]. 
 7  Radin, supra note 1, at 961 (“Property is damnation as well as salvation, object-
fetishism as well as moral groundwork.”).  
 8  Compare the role of property as conveying relative status in Nestor M. 
Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 768 (2008) (internal 
quotations omitted) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291–92 
(2007) (1890)) (“[I]t is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls 
mine the line is difficult to draw.  We feel and act about certain things that are ours 
very much as we feel and act about ourselves . . . .”). 
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confines our growth.9  The concept allows little room for 
experimenting with our personality and testing our lifestyle.  This 
Article further argues that the sharing economy,10 and the access 
revolution it has inspired, create an alternative property use: property 
without personhood. 
Access allows consumers to use assets on a casual basis instead of 
purchasing unnecessary objects.11  People choose to access cars casually 
on an as-needed basis rather than own or lease a vehicle.12  Some users 
would rather borrow or rent a drill and not buy one, only to use it twice 
a year.  Indeed, among the reported advantages of access are saving 
costs and promoting sustainability.13  Moreover, consumer researchers 
have suggested that access symbolizes flexibility, mobility, and 
openness to change.14  Much like property as personhood, we may 
conclude, access is a choice that communicates the identity of the user.  
People who choose access do not seek stability, but prefer a more 
casual lifestyle.15  However, we should proceed with caution.  It is easy 
to attribute personality traits to consumer choices.16  This view tends to 
 
 9  See infra Part I.B.4. 
 10  On the sharing economy, see RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS 
YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010).  See Alice Witt et al., 
Regulating Ride-Sharing in the Peer Economy, 1 COMM. RES. & PRAC. 174 (2015); Rashmi 
Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241 (2015) [hereinafter Dyal-Chand, 
Regulating Sharing]; Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local 
Governmental Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” (Geo. Mason 
L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 15-01, 2015); Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean 
Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413 
(2015); Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up 
Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16 (2015); Kellen Zale, 
Sharing Property, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).  See also BETH BUCZYNSK, SHARING 
IS GOOD: HOW TO SAVE MONEY, TIME AND RESOURCES THROUGH COLLABORATIVE 
CONSUMPTION (2013). 
 11  Examples of access-based projects are TURO, www.turo.com (last visited Feb. 22, 
2017); NEIGHBORGOODS, www.neighborgoods.net (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); and 
PEERBY, www.peerby.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 12  ZipCar and Car2Go offer customers short-term rentals cars owned by a 
commercial company.  Turo is a peer-to-peer market that allows private owners to rent 
out their cars.  See Jörg Firnkorn & Martin Müller, Selling Mobility instead of Cars: New 
Business Strategies of Automakers and the Impact on Private Vehicle Holding, 21 BUS. STRATEGY 
& ENV’T 264 (2011).  
 13  Cait Poynor Lamberton & Randall L. Rose, When Is Ours Better Than Mine? A 
Framework for Understanding and Altering Participation in Commercial Sharing Systems, 76 J. 
MARKETING 109 (2012).  
 14  Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car 
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 890 (2012). 
 15  Cf. Fleura Bardhi et al., Liquid Relationship to Possessions, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 510 
(2012). 
 16  See, e.g., Russell Belk, You are what you can access: Sharing and collaborative 
consumption online, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1595 (2014) [hereinafter Belk, You are what you can 
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be reductionist.  The argument in this Article is more nuanced, namely 
that access allows users to experiment and push the boundaries of their 
engagements with property.  When someone chooses to buy or lease 
an asset, s/he might consider the reflection of this choice on his/her 
identity or its perception by the community.17  On the other hand, if 
one only accesses this asset, there is no financial commitment, and 
there is more room to experiment.18  Toy lending libraries make a good 
example.  When children do not buy a toy, but instead exchange toys 
frequently, boys are willing to try toys normally associated with girls.19  
There is more openness to experimenting with property.20  
Ownership’s stability is limiting, while access has a liberating 
component.21 
This aspect of ownership and possession has yet to be considered 
by property legal theory.  The claim is not an attack on ownership or 
the vision of property as personhood per se.22 The goal is to highlight 
alternatives.  The existence of alternatives, facilitated by the rise of the 
sharing economy, allows users to evaluate their choices and question 
the role of property as personhood in their lives.23  Moreover, stability 
and attachment become more meaningful when there is also an 
opportunity to experiment.  For this reason, this Article argues that the 
law should protect access as an option, and the ability to choose it.  At 
certain points in one’s life, access will be the most effective lifestyle 
choice.  People may desire flexibility and mobility when they are 
younger and prefer stability as they get older.  In addition, some 
individuals will combine attachment and stability with a certain level of 
flexibility.  The law should support these choices. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I presents the importance of 
personhood and stability in property legal theory and its influence on 
legal doctrines.  It will then consider the various critiques of the 
property as personhood approach.  Part II depicts the rise of access, 
and considers the economic and cultural factors leading to its 
newfound prominence.  It will also consider the role of access in 
allowing people to experiment with their identity and push the 
 
access]; Russell Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988) 
[hereinafter Belk, Extended Self]. 
 17  See Davidson, supra note 8. 
 18  See infra notes 194–197 and accompanying text. 
 19  See Lucie K. Ozanne & Paul W. Ballantine, Sharing as a form of anti-consumption? 
An examination of toy library users, 9 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 485, 489 (2010).  
 20  Id.  
 21  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 22  See infra Part I. 
 23  See infra Part II. 
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boundaries of their personhood, as well as the normative difficulties of 
choosing access.  Part III introduces general recommendations for 
legal reform and explicates, in very broad strokes, the importance of 
legal support of property without personhood.  Finally, Part IV offers 
concluding remarks. 
I. PROPERTY, PERSONHOOD AND STABILITY 
A. The Approach 
The role of property in supporting, shaping or recognizing 
personhood begins with Hegel’s theory of person.24  Hegel’s person 
starts as an abstract unit of will, which becomes a concrete individual 
by controlling an external object.25  It is not property in itself but the 
control of property by a person that makes one an individual.26  This 
argument does not distinguish among types of property: it is the 
control of an asset, recognized by the community, that supports 
personhood.27  It is through the recognition of others that one 
recognizes herself.28  The right-holder is understood as a sovereign, 
exerting power, and is thus constituted as a concrete being.29  
Moreover, according to Jeremy Waldron, engaging with property has 
an important temporal aspect, as “the actions that an individual 
performs on or with the object now may constrain or determine the 
actions that he can perform on or with it later.”30  Property embodies 
will by forcing the individual to become consistent and stable over 
time.31 
The general concept of property’s role in the achievement of 
personhood is twofold.  First, people define themselves at least partly 
by what they have.32  When a person changes an object, structures or 
uses it, according to the claim, she cements her identity in the object.  
She has to acknowledge her responsibility when she changes the 
property, since the process is irreversible.33  Second, objects tell us 
something about their owner: they reveal her likes and dislikes, her 
 
 24  See HEGEL, supra note 2. 
 25  BRUDNER, supra note 1. 
 26  WALDRON, supra note 1. 
 27  Id. 
 28  See Knowles, supra note 2. 
 29  See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 377–78. 
 30  Id. at 373. 
 31  Id.  
 32  Cf. Davidson, supra note 8.  
 33  See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 364–65. 
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tastes and preferences,34 her status in life35 or the choices she has made.  
Our property says something about us to the world and, at the same 
time, helps us shape an image of ourselves.  For example, consider 
personal possessions, such as clothes, books, and furniture.  These 
objects allow owners to project personality outwards and structure 
their own experiences inwards. 
Margaret Radin has stressed in her seminal work the attachment 
of subject to an object.  Possession of certain objects contributes to 
achieving self-development.36  She distinguishes between fungible 
assets that do not warrant special protection and personhood property, 
which suggests “a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely 
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”37  
However, the subjective assessment is accompanied by a normative 
judgment.  A fully developed theory of property as personhood 
embodies a normative evaluation that separates the fetish from 
attachments.  Indeed, Radin is well aware of the duality that lies in 
property relations.  She explains: 
Property is damnation as well as salvation, object-fetishism as 
well as moral groundwork.  In this view, the relationship 
between the shoe fetishist and his shoe will not be respected 
like that between the spouse and her wedding ring.  At the 
extreme, anyone who lives only for material objects is 
considered not to be a well-developed person, but rather to 
be lacking some important attribute of humanity.38 
The Radinian approach is not abstract; it engages with particular 
types of property that contribute to self-development.  A key example 
is the home.  According to Radin, the home is closely connected to 
personhood because it is the “scene of one’s history and future, one’s 
life and growth.”39  The car is also part of the same list, as cars are “the 
repository of personal effects, and cars form the backdrop for carrying 
on private thoughts or intimate relationships, just as homes do.”40 
Radin’s perception of property is non-formalist.  Her argument 
highlights the value of continuing possession as the foundation for 
personhood.  She does not focus on formal property rights, but on 
people’s engagement with property.  Personhood is not attributable to 
 
 34  See Knowles, supra note 2, at 56–57.  
 35  See Pollack, supra note 1, at 1397–1406. 
 36  Radin, supra note 1. 
 37  Id. at 986.  
 38  Id. at 961. 
 39  Id. at 992. 
 40  Id. at 1001.  
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ownership per se, but to people’s attachment to objects.  Accordingly, 
she argues that housing should not be treated as an ordinary market 
commodity.41  Occupational rights of tenants are to be characterized 
as personhood property, and the ownership rights of landlords are 
fungible property.42 
The property as personhood approach has proven remarkably 
influential in American property law.  It is not only central to the study 
of modern property theory,43 but has also played a leading role in 
shaping legal doctrines.  Based on the personhood interest in the 
home, Radin and others argue for strong protection of privacy rights 
in residential property,44 and in favor of rent control protection.45  In 
addition, different scholars advocate for the protection of the home 
from involuntary dislocation, relying on the role of the home in 
building identity and well-being.46  The personhood approach has 
been supported by empirical work.  The home, according to these 
studies, creates a sense of belonging, permanence, and continuity.47  It 
allows the individual to know where she is located.48  Alongside its 
individual meanings, the home is also a locus of relationships.  It 
 
 41  Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 351 
(1986) [hereinafter Radin, Residential Rent Control]. 
 42  Id. at 960, 993. 
 43  GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROPERTY THEORY 57–69 (2012); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTIES 
OF PROPERTY (2012); see STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 82 (1990); Nestor 
M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 447–48 (2011). 
 44  Radin, supra note 1, at 996–1002; Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The Costs of the Fourth 
Amendment: Home Searches and Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).  See 
discussion and critique in Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing 
Exceptionalism and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2010) [hereinafter 
Stern, The Inviolate Home].  Cf. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 256, 259 (2006). 
 45  Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 41. 
 46  For a general critique, see Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the 
Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2009) [hereinafter Stern, 
Residential Protectionism].  See also Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home Dwellers: 
Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 285 (2006) (defining 
the home as a space for developing identity); Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home”: A Re-
Analysis of Gender, Homeownership and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 434 (2008) [hereinafter Fox, Re-Possessing Home] (“The 
impact of losing one’s home on an individual occupier’s quality of life, social and 
identity status, personal and family relationships, and for his or her emotional, 
psychological, and physical health and well-being have been well-established in 
housing and health literature.”); Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept 
or a Legal Challenge?, 29 J.L. SOC’Y 580 (2002) [hereinafter Fox, The Meaning of Home]. 
 47  Fox, The Meaning of Home, supra note 46; Judith Sixsmith, The Meaning of Home: 
an Exploratory Study of Environmental Experience, 6 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 281 (1986). 
 48  Fox, The Meaning of Home, supra note 46, at 593. 
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functions as a social and cultural unit of interaction.  The home enables 
interactions with others, either as guests, neighbors, the people one 
lives with,49 or even pets.50 
Furthermore, intellectual property scholars have also relied on 
personhood theories to justify the protection of intellectual property 
as a property institution,51 and to support the moral standing of 
copyright.52  For example, Roberta Kwall argues that artistic work 
reflects the author’s meaning and “an embodiment of her message.”53 
Other notable examples include the ongoing discussion 
regarding property interests in the human body,54 and the 
conceptualization of inheritance and succession that stresses the 
importance of preserving intergenerational connections.55 
To sum up, personhood theory has played a key role in the 
analysis of various legal problems.  Its influence on American legal 
thought is significant.  Yet property’s role in supporting long-term 
goals for individuals reaches beyond attachment to possessions.  
Property connotes stability.  Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky 
argue that property is a mechanism for protecting stable ownership 
value.56  Owner’s control and the right to exclude preserve the owner’s 
idiosyncratic values and bargaining position.57  Property law achieves 
 
 49  Sixsmith, supra note 47; Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qualities of a Home, 14 J. 
ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 31, 39 (1994).  See also Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A Critical 
Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 62, 68 (2004). 
 50  Smith, supra note 49, at 37. 
 51  Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).  
 52  Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 795, 845 (2001) (“Conceptually, the dignity-based right of integrity is a personal 
right, one that demands respect for the author’s person (and the person’s artist), her 
personhood, and inviolate personality, as reflected in her creation.  All of these interests 
must be said to terminate with the death of the author.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive 
Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (“Another group of 
scholars reasons instead that creators deserve moral rights in their works . . . because 
the works are important components of creators’ personhoods (the aspects of 
creators’ personalities infused into and bound up in their works).”). 
 53  ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 25 (2010). 
 54  Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000); 
Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right in Human 
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
 55  Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Can One Inherit a Home as Opposed to a House? A Normative 
and Comparative Perspective, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 735 (2014); Karen J. Sneddon, 
The Will as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355 (2013).  
 56  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4. 
 57  Id.  
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stability for owners and for third parties.58  To conclude, then, property 
connects people to their community by providing a means for self-
identification, growth and stability.  However, as we shall see, this 
important role limits the possibility of changing, experimenting and 
living a flexible lifestyle. 
B. Personhood’s Critiques 
Although the property as personhood approach is undoubtedly 
central, it has also drawn significant criticism.  These critiques are 
diverse and range from disputing its core rationale59  to concerns over 
its social implications.60  This section reviews the most notable 
objections and then adds a new concern regarding the growth and 
development of identity.61 
1. Psychological Validity 
Stephanie Stern questions the validity of the personhood claim 
and challenges the endorsement of its insights.62  She claims there is a 
panoply of laws designed to protect or increase the likelihood “that an 
owner can retain her residential real estate despite creditor claims, 
government eminent domain action, or market fluctuations.”63  She 
critically refers to this array of protections as “residential 
protectionism.”64  Stern disputes the moral status of these protections, 
forcefully arguing that there is little evidence from psychological 
research to support the argument that the home constructs identity.65  
According to her survey, evidence show that personality traits, values, 
social role and the body are more connected to the self than 
possessions.66  Moreover, she reclassifies property and maintains that 
the home is less connected to the self than diaries, pictures, old letters 
and heirlooms.67  This finding does not disprove the relevance of the 
approach, but deflects attention away from the home.  In addition, 
Stern argues that people do not always prefer personhood property to 
 
 58  Id.  See also Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 4 (arguing that property law achieves 
stability but highlighting the role of lawbreakers in undermining stability and fostering 
the evolution of property). 
 59  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 60  See infra Parts I.B.2–I.B.4. 
 61  See infra Part I.B.4. 
 62  Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46. 
 63  Id. at 1100. 
 64  Id.   
 65  Id.  
 66  Id. at 1110. 
 67  Id. at 1111. 
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fungible property such as money.68  Finally, Stern argues that property 
does not construct identity but rather expresses identity and even 
maintains it.69  Indeed, “[h]omes and other possessions express 
attitudes, values, personal history, ethnic identity, and self-perceived 
status, or bolster an image of self we wish to convey to others.”70  Yet 
this reflective function does not justify legal protection.  Considering 
the social costs,71 Stern concludes that ongoing control over the home 
is not a prerequisite for psychological flourishing.72 
This argument does not negate the personhood approach 
altogether, but stresses the dynamic nature of attachment.73  It seeks to 
overturn the claims against displacement.  It maintains that people 
change and replace property frequently and the home cannot be seen 
as a rigid and sacred category.  Jeffery Douglas Jones reinforces this 
conclusion from a different perspective.  He argues that attachment to 
possession is so abundant that there is no need of legal possession.74  
Everything is personal property, and things kept and things lost are 
part of the circle of life.75 
2. Pragmatism and Values 
Stephen Schnably criticizes Radin’s pragmatist focus on 
consensus as the foundation for property as personhood.76  He makes 
two important claims.  First, he argues that there is never any true 
consensus.77  A search for consensus merely obscures relevant 
controversies.  Radin’s assertion that the home allows for self-
constitution ignores the historical context of the home as a middle-
class suburban artifact.78  According to Schnably, this perception 
rejects the importance of the public sphere in favor of private life, 
constitutes women’s role as homemakers, and excludes non-nuclear 
 
 68  Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46, at 1112. 
 69  Id.  
 70  Id. at 1113. 
 71  Id. at 1095. 
 72  Id. at 1096. 
 73  Id. at 1114. 
 74  See Jeffery Douglas Jones, Property as Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & 
POL’Y 93 (2011).  
 75  Id.  
 76  Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of 
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 373–74 (1993).  Cf. Richard Thompson 
Ford, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood: A Review of Margaret Jane Radin’s 
Reinterpreting Property, 48 STAN. L. REV. 217 (1995). 
 77  Schnably, supra note 76, at 363. 
 78  Id. at 365. 
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families.79 
His second claim is that it is impossible to follow a consensus 
without constituting it at the same time.80  Indeed, “what we as a society 
choose to recognize and protect as personal inevitably affects 
subsequent choices by individuals of how and where to embody 
themselves.”81  For this reason 
[t]he ideal of the home is not one simply constructed by 
individuals, but is one that has been actively fostered by the 
state and other ‘private’ actors wielding significant social 
power . . . [s]ince the law itself often shapes consensus, 
purporting to rely on consensus to shape the law is a 
dangerous exercise in circularity.82 
While Stern’s critique focused on the validity of Radin’s 
argument, Schnably is more concerned with its normative strength.  It 
is a meta-critique about legal theory’s struggle to grapple with social 
conventions and ideals.  More importantly, it provides a skeptical take 
on pragmatism and universalism.83  His argument directs our attention 
to the power embedded in social structures, and to the winners and 
losers of current property regimes. 
3. Relative Status 
The role of property as reflecting and shaping identity is intricate.  
If property communicates a vision of the self, then it becomes a vehicle 
for communicating messages of status, and in particular relative 
status.84  Attachment to material possessions draws, at least partly, on 
comparison to others.85  Property thus marks and reinforces economic, 
social and cultural hierarchies.86  A comparison to other people “may 
over-incentivize the production of, or investment in, status-related 
resources.”87  This potential interrelation between personhood and 
possessions may fuel competitive consumption.88  Although it does not 
fall within the category of property fetish,89 communicating status is 
 
 79  Id. at 365–66. 
 80  Id. at 363. 
 81  Id. at 371–72. 
 82  Id. at 374–75.  
 83  Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 409 (1993). 
 84  See Davidson, supra note 8.  
 85  See id. 
 86  Id. at 760–61. 
 87  Id. at 762.  
 88  Id. at 799–800. 
 89  Radin, supra note 1, at 961. 
KREICZER-LEVY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  3:27 PM 
782 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:771 
reductionist.  Instead of bolstering self-development, it has the 
potential to distort identity and personality.90  The identity-signaling 
function of property has given rise to a countermovement, supporting 
ecological and anti-consumerist motivations that steer away from 
ownership as a source of personal meaning.91  Because relative status is 
tied up with consumption, it drives an anti-consumerist rebuttal, which 
manifests itself in, among other things, the rise of access.92 
4. Growth and Change 
This Article identifies an additional risk that the conflation of 
property and identity creates.  Attachment to possessions is inherently 
restrictive.  It connects the individual to a particular setting, 
geographically and personally, making it harder for the individual to 
move and change environments.  The more property people have, the 
more tied down they are to a particular time, place and community.93  
Because ownership is associated with stability and security,94 it might 
result in limiting choices. 
The ability to change one’s life story, to develop goals and adapt 
new points of view is an essential component of the liberal 
understanding of autonomy.95  Property as personhood and stability 
creates barriers to change.  In order to move, one needs to sell 
property and buy new things.  Of course, property can be sold and 
bought, as exchange is the foundation of our economic system.96  Yet 
transactions are costly and cumbersome, and offer less flexibility than 
 
 90  Davidson, supra note 8, at 762.  
 91  See KIM HUMPHERY, EXCESS: ANTI-CONSUMERISM IN THE WEST (2013). 
 92  See id. 
 93  See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).  
 94  Lynda Cheshire et al., The Politics of Housing Consumption: Renters as Flawed 
Consumers on a Master Planned Estate, 47 URB. STUD. 2597, 2599 (2010) (suggesting that 
ownership promotes ontological security).  Cf.  Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A 
Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 62, 66 (2004) (arguing that governments 
promote homeownership as creating stability in order to shift the burden of welfare to 
the family).  It has similarly been suggested that home ownership ideology promotes 
a property-based citizenship, privileging home ownership over public and rental 
housing.  See RICHARD RONALD, THE IDEOLOGY OF HOME OWNERSHIP: HOMEWORKER 
SOCIETIES AND THE ROLE OF HOUSING (2008). 
 95  WENDY DONNER, THE LIBERAL SELF: JOHN STUART MILL’S MORAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 92–94, 118 (1991); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (David Spitz ed., 
1975) (1859); John L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and 
Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 570–71 (2004); Anthony T. Kronman, 
Paternalism and the Law of Contract, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 780–83 (1983). 
 96  Compare Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & 
ECON. 11 (1964); GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989), with 
BRUDNER, supra note 1, at 56 (explaining that according to Hegel, exchange involves 
the recognition of the other’s personhood). 
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nonmaterial assets.97  Financial means are different from material 
possession because they are culturally understood as representing 
liquidity and choice.98 
This critique will be at the focus of this Article, along with the rise 
of access in the sharing economy.  However, the Article does not 
challenge the cultural, social and economic validity of property as 
personhood.  On the contrary, it is because property is understood as 
an expression of the self that it becomes limiting.  Recognizing access 
as a form of property use will allow individuals to experiment with their 
preferences and narrow the role of property in constructing or 
projecting their identity. 
Moreover, stability and coherence are important traits of 
property, but they contribute to a certain lifestyle and relational 
choices.  Mobility and flexibility are alternative choices that require a 
different mode of property engagement.  These two forms of use can— 
and should—coexist to provide an array of choices for individuals. 
II. THE RISE OF ACCESS 
A. Access: Definition and Background 
Access is a form of casual use that is detached from the asset 
itself.99  Access breaks the connection between use and possession.  The 
use value of property, its function, is produced without committing to 
continued use of one particular article.100  This definition of access is 
different from two kindred uses of the term.  First, Jeremey Rifkin uses 
access to refer to the structure of a new business model in his influential 
book, The Age of Access.101  Rifkin argues that ownership of market goods 
 
 97  Cf. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17–24 (1982). 
 98  Christine Desan, Coin Reconsidered: The Political Alchemy of Commodity Money, 11 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 361 (2010) (discussing liquidity as the unique quality that 
sets money apart from a commodity); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF 
MONEY 149 (1997) (discussing the liberating power of money to inspire choice). 
 99  Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access (Feb. 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access]; see 
also supra note 11. 
 100  See Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, in THE MARX ENGELS READER 221, 256–57 (Robert 
C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).  See also Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1369 (2011) [hereinafter Dyal-Chand, Useless Property]; Peñalver, Land Virtues, 
supra note 93; Lee Ann Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008) 
(discussing homeownership as consumption and investment).  Cf. Avihay Dorfman, 
The Normativity of the Private Ownership Form, 75 MOD. L. REV. 981, 983 (2012) (“[W]hile 
the owner holds the (arguably) legitimate right to use her object, to the exclusion of 
others, she can also exclude simply for the sake of excluding others with no necessary 
reference to use, even potential use, at all.”).  
 101  JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM, 
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has become outdated in the new network economy: “markets are 
making ways for networks and ownership is steadily being replaced by 
access.”102  Exchange of ownership cannot adapt to rapid technological 
advances, information flows and human creativity.  Short-term access 
through lease, rent, subscriptions, or memberships is flexible but also 
creates attachments to commercial brands.103  When a dealer sells a car 
to a buyer, their relationship is limited; it often ends with the sale.  If 
the client gains access to the car in the form of a lease, the relationship 
is ongoing.104  It becomes what Rifkin terms “a commodifying 
relationship.”105  Consequently, “[w]hen everyone is embedded in 
commercial networks of one sort or another and in continuous 
association by way of paid leases, partnerships, subscriptions and 
retainer fees, all time is commercial time.”106 
Nonetheless, Rifkin discusses a possibly perpetual relationship 
between a commercial company and a consumer.107  In many ways, 
access as identified by Rifkin almost fifteen years ago essentially takes 
the form of long-term engagement with assets and brands that lacks a 
formal ownership component.108  This access also lacks the consumer’s 
control over the asset, making consumers more vulnerable and less 
powerful.109  Access as depicted in this Article relates to more casual 
and detached relations to property.  It mostly concerns individuals 
seeking either to lower the costs of consumption or to make use of 
excess capacity.110 
Second, this definition of access is also distinguishable from the 
familiar understanding of open-access resources.  Open-access 
concerns resources that can be claimed and used by everyone.111  Open-
access resources have important social and environmental value.112  
 
WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE (2000). 
 102  Id. at 4. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at 10. 
 105  Id.  
 106  Id.  
 107  RIFKIN, supra note 101, at 10. 
 108  Id. at 98 (discussing the new economy’s goal, which is not to sell the product to 
many clients but to sell many products to one client). 
 109  Id. at 6. 
 110  See, e.g., Gabriel H. Mugar, A Practice Perspective on Websites for the Sharing Economy, 
ICONF. PROC. 738 (2012); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the 
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004). 
 111  Peter Ekbäck, Private, Common, and Open Access Property Rights in Land – An 
Investigation of Economic Principles and Legislation, 6 NORDIC J. SURVEYING & REAL EST. RES. 
57, 59 (2009).  
 112  Daniel Mishori, Reclaiming Commons Rights: Resources, Public Ownership and the 
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Certain resources, such as beaches and open spaces, are “inherently 
public.”113  Open-access to public resources is very different from the 
option of access that this Article analyzes.  Access allows individuals to 
constantly replace assets, use them casually, and move on to the next 
object.  In contrast, open-access concerns the use of one common pool 
of resources114 which typically are not easily distributed to private 
individuals, such as beaches, open spaces, water, and so on.115  The 
literature references public access to public or quasi-public resources, 
not everyday goods.116  Access as a form of flexibility and choice, as 
portrayed in this Article, is not about regulating public resources.  
Rather, it is about the individual’s use and enjoyment of personal 
assets. 
Access as a distinct form of casual use is rooted in two important 
developments: the sharing economy and global nomadism.117  The 
sharing economy is a modern form of consumption based on 
collaboration in the use, production, or creation of products and 
services.118  Rauch & Schleicher define it as a “stark reduction in 
transaction costs that allows for radically disaggregated 
consumption.”119  The sharing economy is actually an umbrella term 
that covers a wide range of transactions, some of them directly 
associated with access.  Other sharing economy transactions are not 
about access, but serve as a background to changing consumption 
modes. 
 
Rights of Future Generations, 8 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 335, 353 (2014) (“[I]t is costly to 
exclude individuals from using the good [and] the benefits consumed by one 
individual subtract from the benefits available to others.”).  
 113  See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).  
 114  Cf. Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 
2003); S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, ‘Common Property’ as a Concept in 
Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975). 
 115  Rose, supra note 113. 
 116  See id.  
 117  For the sharing economy see infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text; for 
global nomadism see infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. 
 118  This review is based in part on Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99.  
BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 10; BUCZYNSK, supra note 10; Danielle Sacks, The Sharing 
Economy, FAST CO. (Apr. 18, 2011, 1:05 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/ 
1747551/sharing-economy; Timm Teubner, Thoughts on the Sharing Economy, 
RESEARCHGATE, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299812647_Trust_in_the_Sharing_ 
Economy (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT 
TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014), http://www.greattransition.org/publication/ 
debating-the-sharing-economy. 
 119  Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 10.  
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First, the sharing economy allows people to make better use of 
their own property.  There are certain types of goods that are designed 
for private consumption but hold an unutilized excess capacity.120  Cars, 
bikes, personal possessions,121 and even a spare room in the home,122  
are good examples.  The sharing economy allows owners, using new 
forms of peer-to-peer markets, to rent out assets such as a car, their 
home, a bicycle, or even pets to strangers.123  Second, the sharing 
economy also includes cooperative projects such as bike-sharing and 
car-sharing.124  Bike-sharing is becoming increasingly popular 
worldwide,125 as a healthy way to travel that does not require owning a 
bike.126  Providers of bikes for access include governments, quasi-
governmental transport agencies, universities, non-profits, and for-
 
 120  Benkler, supra note 110. 
 121  Yuliya Chernova, Peer-to-Peer Car Rental Startup RelayRides Hopes to Escape Silicon 
Valley Bubble, VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (June 14, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
venturecapital/2014/06/24/peer-to-peer-car-rental-startup-relayrides-hopes-to-
escape-silicon-valley-bubble/; How NeighborGoods Works, VIMEO (2010), https://vim 
eo.com/10659908 (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).  
 122  Airbnb is a site that allows people to rent out houses for short-term periods.  
Tomio Geron, Airbnb And The Unstoppable Rise Of The Share Economy, FORBES (Feb. 11, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unsto 
ppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/; Tapio Ikkala & Airi Lampinen, Defining the Price of 
Hospitality: Networked Hospitality Exchange via Airbnb, CSCW COMPANION 173 (2014).  On 
the regulation of Airbnb, see Airbnb in the City, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. ST. N.Y., 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); 
Julie Bort, Airbnb: 124 New York Airbnb Hosts “May Be Flagrantly Misusing Our Platform”, 
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-gives-ag-info-
on-124-ny-hosts-2014-8.  See also Lauren Frayer, Uber, Airbnb Under Attack In Spain As Old 
And New Economies Clash, NPR ONLINE (July 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs 
/parallels/2014/07/29/327796899/uber-airbnbunder-attack-in-spain-as-old-and-
new-economy-clash; Brad Tuttle, 7 Cities Where the Sharing Economy Is Freshly Under 
Attack, TIME.COM (June 9, 2014), http://time.com/money/2800742/uber-lyft-airbnb-
sharingeconomy-city-regulation; Brian Summers, Airbnb’s short-term rentals break law in 
Los Angeles, says city memo, DAILY BREEZE (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.dailybreeze.com 
/business/20140321/airbnbs-short-term-rentals-break-law-inlos-angeles-says-city-
memo. 
 123  Peer-to-peer (P2P) markets are markets where trade occurs between peers.  See, 
e.g., Anindya Ghose, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis & Arun Sundararajan, Reputation Premiums 
in Peer-to-Peer Markets: Analyzing Textual Feedback and Network Structure, in P2PECON ‘05: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 ACM SIGCOMM WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER 
SYSTEMS 150–54 (2005), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1080207.  
 124  There have been several attempts at bike sharing since the 1960s, but most have 
proven unsuccessful in the long-run, until the new “third generation” bike sharing.  See 
Paul DeMaio, Bike-sharing: History, Impacts, Models of Provision, and Future, 12 J. PUB. 
TRANSP. 41 (2009).  
 125  Oliver O’Brien et al., Mining Bicycle Sharing Data for Generating Insights into 
Sustainable Transport Systems, 34 J. TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 262, 262 (2014).  
 126  Id. at 262. 
KREICZER-LEVY  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  3:27 PM 
2017] PROPERTY WITHOUT PERSONHOOD 787 
profits.127  Users include commuters, leisure users who bicycle for fun 
and exercise, and tourists.128  A third type of sharing economy 
transactions includes lending, bartering, and swapping.129  These 
transactions do not include access but instead are about an exchange 
of ownership.  Fourth, the sharing economy involves neighborhood-
based cooperative endeavors designed to foster trust and 
cooperation.130  These include, for example, tool, toy, and clothing 
libraries131 and community gardens.132  Fifth, many companies now offer 
services that are based on use and access rather than ownership and 
possession.133  A sixth example of the sharing economy includes people 
who share their time, skills, and expertise.134 
All these transactions are becoming prevalent in everyday life.  
Notable consumer researchers argue that the rise of collaborative 
consumption has led to a decline in the symbolic significance of 
ownership,135 and that access-based consumption allows flexibility and 
adaptability, creating a different relationship with possession that is 
 
 127  DeMaio, supra note 124, at 45. 
 128  O’Brien et al., supra note 125, at 262, 267, 269.  
 129  See generally Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in 
Collaborative Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2047 (forthcoming 2016). 
          130 Christopher D. Cook, Seed Libraries Fight for the Right to Share, SHAREABLE (Feb. 11, 
2015), http://www.shareable.net/blog/seed-libraries-fight-for-the-right-to-share; Cat 
Johnson, The Tool Library Movement Gains Steam, SHAREABLE (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-tool-library-movement-gains-steam. 
 131  Johnson, supra note 130 (“[N]o longer just places to get a drill when you need 
one . . . [but rather] neighborhood hubs offering classes, community building spaces, 
workshops and a variety of tools ranging from belt sanders to lawnmowers and more.”). 
 132  Efrat Eizenberg, The Changing Meaning of Community Space: Two Models of NGO 
Management of Community Gardens in New York City, 36 INT’L J. URB. & REG. RES. 106 
(2012); Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local 
Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (2000); Joan 
Twiss et al., Community Gardens: Lessons Learned From California Healthy Cities and 
Communities, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1435 (2003). 
 133  Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 16.  This is particularly common in 
the car-sharing business.  Automobile manufacturers are buying or starting car-sharing 
enterprises such as Zipcar (Avis) and Car2Go (Benz).  See also Jörg Firnkorn & Martin 
Müller, Selling Mobility Instead of Cars: New Business Strategies of Automakers and the Impact 
on Private Vehicle Holding, 21 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 264 (2012) (indicating that the 
number of private vehicles is dropping due to consumer preferences). 
 134  See, e.g., Catherine Lee Rassman, Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation: 
Examining the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board, 15 
PITTSBURGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81 (2014); Janelle Orsi, The Sharing Economy Just Got 
Real, SHAREABLE (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.mayorsinnovation.org/images/upload 
s/pdf/3.The_Sharing_Economy_Just_Got_Real.pdf; Brad Stone, My Life as a 
TaskRabbit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2012, 4:37 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/new 
s/articles/2012-09-13/my-life-as-a-taskrabbit. 
 135  Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14; Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 
16. 
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termed “liquid.”136 
Global nomadism, the voluntary mobility of elite workers that is 
“characterized by serial relocations, frequent short-term international 
travel, and deterritorialization,”137 has also contributed to the decline 
of ownership and attachment to possessions.138  Global mobility has 
become a common phenomenon in a globalized world, which builds 
on the demand for skilled labor in the global economy.139  Fleura 
Bardhi, Giana Eckhardt, and Eric Arnould found global nomads to 
have a liquid relationship to possessions that is detached, flexible, 
temporal, and situational.140 
Globalization and changing consumption modes serve as the 
background to the rise of access.  This Article focuses on three 
performances of access in contemporary society: peer-to-peer access, 
community lending libraries, and a mobility-based flexible lifestyle. 
Peer-to-peer markets allow owners to rent out personal property 
to casual users.141  Users choose to access instead of own.  Many types 
of property are being rented out, from personal vehicles142 to bikes, 
ladders, and lawnmowers.143  One can even casually spend time with a 
dog via BorrowMyDoggy; users can therefore choose to use John’s car 
today and Jane’s car next week.144 
A more communal form of access to property is found in 
community lending libraries.  For example, toy lending libraries allow 
children and their parents to borrow toys, games, and puzzles.145  
Instead of buying toys, a child exchanges toys every few weeks.146  
Parents typically assist the librarian and enjoy joint activities.147 
 Tool libraries allow people to borrow various tools, and 
occasionally serve as a common working space.148  Clothing libraries 
 
 136  Bardhi et al., supra note 15.  
          137 Bardhi et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Aihwa Ong, Please Stay: Pied-a-Terre Subjects in the Megacity, 11 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 
83 (2007); JOHN URRY, MOBILITIES (2007). 
 140  Bardhi et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
 141  See Ghose, supra note 123. 
 142  See GET AROUND INC., https://www.getaround.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2017); 
JUSTSHAREIT, www.justshareit.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2017); TURO, https://www.turo. 
com (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).  
 143  See NEIGHBORGOODS, www.neighborgoods.net (last visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
 144  BORROW MY DOGGY, www.borrowmydoggy.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2017). 
 145  Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19, at 488. 
 146  Id. 
 147  See, e.g., KARORI TOY LIBRARY, http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/belonging 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
 148  Johnson, supra note 130. 
KREICZER-LEVY  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  3:27 PM 
2017] PROPERTY WITHOUT PERSONHOOD 789 
allow members to borrow clothes for free or for a membership fee, and 
satisfy the desire for diversity and novelty in fashion without 
overspending and overconsuming.149 
Finally, access as a lifestyle choice is manifested in a new urban-
planning modality.  WeWork, a company that provides a collaborative 
workplace, has recently launched a housing project that supports a 
flexible lifestyle.150  These projects, simply termed “WeLive,” provide 
micro-housing units that are completely furnished, including 
kitchenware and dishes, linens and bedding, and offer month-to-
month leases.151  The units are small but there are common areas and 
common activities.152 
Developers of micro-units generally assume that the people who 
use them will spend considerable time outside the home.153  In 
particular, developers assume that dwellers will not own cars but 
instead depend on a sharing mechanism.154  According to John 
Infranca, “[a] few recent micro-unit developments have successfully 
negotiated substantial reductions to the required on-site parking in 
exchange for providing car and bike sharing.”155  Micro-units in general 
and the month-to-month lease offered by WeLive in particular 
accommodate a flexible lifestyle.  Dwellers are not attached to their 
home, do not own a car, and can easily relocate.  Access supports and 
accommodates this lifestyle. 
Finally, although access is a rising phenomenon, even users who 
enthusiastically participate in the sharing economy have a strong 
 
         149 On clothing libraries, see Vedra Korobar, The Interconnection of Sustainability 
and Collaborative Consumption: A Case Study of Clothing Libraries (Spring 2013) 
(unpublished M.S. thesis, Lund University) (on file with Lund University library 
system), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3800 
323&fileOId=3800324. 
 150  See Katherine Clarke, “Dorm” Is the New Norm: Communal Living Spaces Offer Short-
term Deals for Young Professionals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2015, 4:33 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/real-estate/nyc-commune-style-micro-
apartment-communities-article-1.2148150; WELIVE, https://www.welive.com (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
 151  See Clarke, supra note 150.  See also David Friedlander, WeLive Marries Micro-
Apartments, Coworking, Magic, LIFE EDITED (July 28, 2014), http://lifeedited.com/weli 
ve-marries-micro-apartments-coworking-magic; Daniel J. Sernovitz, Work Where You 
Live? For WeWork Fans, There’s a Place for that in Crystal City, WASHINGTON BUS. J. (Mar. 
16, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/201 
5/03/work-where-you-live-for-wework-fans-theres-a-place.html. 
 152  Clarke, supra note 150.  See John Infranca, Spaces for Sharing: Micro Units Amid the 
Shift from Ownership to Access, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 21 (forthcoming 2017). 
 153  Id. at 7. 
 154  Id.  
 155  Id. at 17.  
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preference for ownership in some cases.156  The tendency towards 
ownership is strong in four categories: (1) intimate possessions, such 
as a toothbrush; (2) frequently used objects—for example, a television; 
(3) objects with emotional attachment, such as heirlooms; and (4) the 
home.157  It is therefore important to note that no paradigm change 
has occurred overthrowing ownership, and with it personhood and 
stability; instead, we are witnessing the gradual and important 
emergence of a more nuanced set of consumer choices. 
B. Motivations for Access 
A number of empirical studies have examined the motivations for 
participation in the sharing economy.158  These studies often refer to 
access as a primary example of collaborative consumption.159 
A prominent study explored four motivations of online 
participants in the sharing economy: sustainability, enjoyment, 
economic benefits, and reputation.160  The study links motivations to 
perception of the sharing economy and to intentions of use.  It found 
that although sustainability and enjoyment affect the attitude towards 
the sharing economy, the economic benefits of saving time and money 
are most likely to affect use intentions.161 
Cait Lamberton and Randell Rose study access from a marketing 
perspective, presenting a case of companies offering access services 
such as commercial car sharing.162  They look into the costs and 
benefits of access.  Costs include membership fees, learning to use new 
vehicles, and search costs.163  In addition, there is risk of consumer 
rivalry over a limited supply of assets.164  The benefits include the value 
of use, flexibility, saving on storage costs, and the psychological 
 
 156  See Cornelia Grimshorn & Marlene Jordan, Ownership: A Challenged 
Consumer Ideal (May 27, 2015) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Lund University) (on file 
with Lund University library system), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=dow 
nloadFile&recordOId=5468892&fileOId=5468905.  
 157  Id. at 29–30. 
 158  See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14; Hamari et al., supra note 129; Lamberton 
& Rose, supra note 13; Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19; Grimshorn & Jordan, supra 
note 156.  
 159  See supra note 158. 
 160  Hamari et al., supra note 129. 
 161  Id. at 2047.  Sustainability did not affect use intentions, but enjoyment did have 
some effect.  Id.  On the other hand, economic benefits had no effect on attitudes 
towards the sharing economy.  Id. 
 162  Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13. 
 163  Id. at 111. 
 164  Id. at 109. 
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benefits of pursuing an anti-industry agenda.165 
Studies on lending libraries show a more diverse set of 
motivations.166  They point to advantages that are specific to more 
communal forms of access.  A qualitative study of clothing libraries in 
Sweden found that users identify with specific garments even if they do 
not own them.167  In addition, they identify with the project itself.168  
They feel that borrowing clothes from a library specializing in quality 
clothes makes them unique, unlike more traditional shoppers.169  
Furthermore, users strive to be sophisticated consumers and 
ecologically conscious.170 
Lucie Ozanne and Paul Ballantine examined the social and 
communal function of community-based toy libraries.171  They 
identified four types of participants: the socialites who value the social 
and communal benefits of toy libraries, market avoiders, anti-
consumers, and passive members.172  To conclude, motivations for 
access include not only saving costs but also flexibility and sociability. 
C. Access: Property Without Personhood 
1. Access as Flexibility and Detachment 
Access is an alternative to ownership that allows for flexibility and 
fluidity.  It breeds detachment to possession and focuses on 
functionality.  This characteristic should prompt scholars to re-evaluate 
the role of property as personhood.  The intricate relationship 
between access and property as personhood has yet to be explored. 
Times have changed.  Personality and self-expression are shaped 
and communicated in various mediums.  Online social networks are a 
prominent example.173  Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers further 
explain: “As our online ‘brands’ define ‘who we are’ and ‘what we like,’ 
actual ownership becomes less important than demonstrating use or 
use by association.  We can now show status, group affiliation, and 
belonging without necessarily having to buy physical objects.”174 
Along with the rise of social networks, there is a change in lifestyle.  
 
 165  Id. at 111.  
 166  Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19; Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156. 
 167  Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156, at 35. 
 168  Id. at 36. 
 169  Id. at 37. 
 170  Id. at 33. 
 171  Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19. 
 172  Id. at 485.  
 173  BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 10, at 98. 
 174  Id.  
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The Y-generation, or millennials, consists of people born after 1981.175  
Millennials are technologically savvy and frequent technology users 
from a young age.176  As a generation, they experienced years of 
prosperity followed by an era of economic uncertainty and violence.177  
They own less property.178  In addition, millennials prefer flexibility 
over security.179  They prioritize choice and instant availability of 
customized products.180  All these factors contribute to this 
generation’s enthusiastic participation in the sharing economy and the 
inclination to favor access over ownership.181 
Access fits well with the tendency towards flexibility and an asset-
light lifestyle.182  As opposed to the vision of property as shaping and 
reflecting personhood,183 access is a choice to use without 
attachment.184  Its primary function as an alternative to ownership is to 
allow fluidity and the ability to experiment.185  Toys may be the perfect 
example.  Toys are usually associated with one’s identity.186  They foster 
 
 175  Ruth N. Bolton et al., Understanding Generation Y and their Use of Social Media: A 
Review and Research Agenda, 24 J. SERV. MGMT. 245, 247 (2013). 
 176  Id. at 257.  See also Jeongdoo Park & Dogan Gursoy, Generation Effects on Work 
Engagement Among U.S. Hotel Employees, 31 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 1195 (2012). 
 177  Bolton et al., supra note 175, at 257.  Susan Eisner, Managing Generation Y, S.A.M. 
ADVANCED MGMT. J. 4, 6 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (“Though it is the most 
affluent generation, some 16% of Gen Y grew up or is growing up in poverty.  In its 
post-Columbine, post-9/11, 24-hour media world, this latest generation has seen more 
at an earlier age than prior generations have seen.”). 
 178  Ann Hayek, How Millennials Are Driving the Sharing Economy, MARKET REALIST 
(Mar. 1, 2016, 1:06 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/millennials-driving-
sharing-economy/.  
 179  Richey Piiparinen et al., The Fifth Migration: A Study of Cleveland Millennials 9–10 
(Cleveland State Univ. Urban Publ’ns, Working Paper No. 1338, 2016), 
http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/urban_facpub/1338.  See also Bolton et al., 
supra note 175. 
 180  Piiparinen et al., supra note 179. 
 181  Hayek, supra note 178. 
 182  Id. 
 183  See discussion supra Part I. 
 184  Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 881 (“Instead of buying and owning things, 
consumers want access to goods and prefer to pay for the experience of temporarily 
accessing them.”). 
 185  Id. at 890 (“[O]ur informants talked of the lifestyle freedom experienced 
because car sharing allows them to experiment and try different or new car models 
that they would not have a chance to otherwise.”).  
 186  Compare Donald W. Ball, Toward a Sociology of Toys: Inanimate Objects, Socialization, 
and the Demography of the Doll World, 8 SOC. Q. 447 (1967) (emphasizing the importance 
of toys in the socialization process), with Joel Best, Too Much Fun: Toys as Social Problems 
and the Interpretation of Culture, 21 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 197 (1998) (criticizing the 
attribution of toys to identity, and the focus on objects rather than actors). 
KREICZER-LEVY  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  3:27 PM 
2017] PROPERTY WITHOUT PERSONHOOD 793 
gender187 and racial identification,188 and reflect personality traits such 
as a tendency towards activity, imagination, or puzzle solving.189  
Because toys and identity are perceived as linked, parents may be 
reluctant to spend money on unconventional toy choices.190  Simply 
put, they are afraid to buy toys their child will ultimately choose not to 
play with.191  Moreover, children may be apprehensive that a certain toy 
may reflect a different personality that they do not necessarily 
endorse.192  For example, “[w]hen children are given a choice of a 
variety of gender-typed and non-gender-typed toys, children 
(especially boys) often choose toys based on gender associations.”193 
Access creates a different behavioral pattern.  When children 
exchange toys in a toy lending library, there is no declaration of 
identification and no financial commitment.194  Children are more 
open to experimentation.  As previously mentioned, boys are willing 
to try toys associated with girls and less active children become more 
physical in their play.195  This point is not purely empirical but rather 
theoretical.  It stresses the potential benefit of decoupling property use 
from personhood.  Once property is understood for its use function196 
instead of its association with the self,197 there is more room for 
exploration and change. 
Adults also need to experiment and push the boundaries of their 
 
 187  Elizabeth Sweet, Boy Builders and Pink Princesses: Gender, Toys, and 
Inequality over the Twentieth Century (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, Davis). 
 188  Erika Engstrom, Toys and Games: Racial Stereotypes and Identity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF GENDER IN THE MEDIA 393 (Mary Kosut ed., 2012) (critically examining racial 
representation in dolls). 
 189  Cf. Donna Fisher-Thompson et al., Toy Selection for Children: Personality and Toy 
Request Influences, 33 SEX ROLES 239 (1995) (studying gender roles and personalities in 
the selection of toys for a child). 
 190  Lucie K. Ozanne & Julie L. Ozanne, Parental Mediation of The Market’s Influence 
on Their Children: Toy Libraries as Safe Havens, http://www.marketing.pamplin.vt.edu/ 
facultyFolder/julieOzanne/01socialwebsite/professional/conference%20papers%20
and%20sessions/2009%20Academy%20of%20Marketing%20Parental%20Mediation
%20of%20Market’s%20Influence%20on%20their%20children.htm (last visited Feb. 
22, 2017) (noting that “because there was no financial commitment to borrowing toys, 
the parents imposed few restrictions”). 
 191  Cf. Fisher-Thompson et al., supra note 189. 
 192  Cf. Ball, supra note 186. 
 193  Erica S. Weisgram et al., Pink Gives Girls Permission: Exploring the Roles of Explicit 
Gender Labels and Gender-Typed Colors on Preschool Children’s Toy Preferences, 35 J. APPLIED 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 401 (2014). 
 194  Cf. Bardhi & Eckhart, supra note 14. 
 195  Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19. 
 196  Cf. Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, supra note 100. 
 197  See supra Part I. 
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identity.  Tool libraries allow people who are not skilled to learn and 
experiment with fixing household appliances or personal vehicles.198  
The learning environment and the freedom from financial 
commitment support this type of experimentation.199 
Another example is pets.  Although the concept of access to pets 
may seem confusing, BorrowMyDoggy is a game changer.  It helps 
match dog owners and dog lovers who want to spend time with a dog 
without the long-term commitment.200  One can contemplate getting a 
dog, or just spend time with a dog casually for a day or an evening.201  
The activity could serve as a hobby or an opportunity to do more 
exercise.202  All these benefits facilitate change with no strings attached. 
These benefits potentially involve a variety of personal property, 
depending on a person’s needs and preferences.  Access can support 
detachment from car models and dis-identification with personal 
vehicles203 or household possessions.  However, real property is a 
different matter.  Housing connotes stability and security.204  People are 
less likely to experiment with permanent living arrangements.  In the 
sphere of housing, whether as owners or as lessees, attachment and 
stability are prominent.205 
Nonetheless, as the WeLive project shows, there is some room for 
 
 198  See About, TORONTO TOOL LIBR., http://torontotoollibrary.com/about-2/ (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2017).  
 199  Cf. Noelia Romero, Interview with Helen, Member #65, EDINBURGH TOOL LIBR. 
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://edinburghtoollibrary.org.uk/news/. 
 200  The BorrowMyDoggy Story, BORROWMYDOGGY, https://www.borrowmydoggy.com 
/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 201  See Waggy Tales Testimonials, Batman, Alex, and Lexie, BORROWMYDOGGY, 
https://www.borrowmydoggy.com/testimonials/batman-alex-lexie (last visited Feb. 
22, 2017) (dog borrowers also enjoy having a dog part time); Waggy Tales Testimonials, 
Charlie, Marion, and June, BORROWMYDOGGY, https://www.borrowmydog 
gy.com/testimonials/charlie-marion-june (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 202  See Waggy Tales Testimonials, Max, Josie, Alice, Sophie, and Lucy, BORROWMYDOGGY, 
https://www.borrowmydoggy.com/testimonials/max-josie-alice-sophie-lucy (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 203  Bardhi & Eckhart, supra note 14. 
 204  KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 178, 187 (1944) (land “invests 
man’s life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition of his physical 
safety; it is the landscape and the seasons”).  Fennell, supra note 100; Fox, The Meaning 
of Home, supra note 46; Fox, Re-Possessing Home, supra note 46; Peñalver, Land Virtues, 
supra note 93, at 830 (“[L]and is sufficiently stable that human transformations will 
remain in place almost indefinitely unless human beings actively restore the land to its 
prior form.”). 
 205  Peñalver, Land Virtues, supra note 93, at 830.  Sheila Klebanow, How Much is 
Enough? A Psychological Overview of Money and the Middle Class, in MONEY AND MIND 3, 6–
7 (Sheila Klebanow & Eugene L. Lowenkopf eds., 1991) (“For many, homeownership 
connotes solidity, stability, self-esteem, putting down roots, and making a commitment 
to oneself, or to marriage and family.”). 
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experimentation in housing.206  Young, unattached individuals might 
prefer a flexible living arrangement rather than commit to long-term 
leases or to homeownership.207  Long-term housing is expensive and 
requires financial stability.208  With the economic downturn and rising 
costs of living, there is a decrease in the ability to own a home.209  
Moreover, month-to-month leases foster mobility because dwellers are 
not tied down to a community or to their homes.  This alternative is 
part of a lifestyle choice that includes living in a dense urban 
environment,210 using car-sharing,211 spending time outside the 
home,212 and the ability to quickly move from place to place.213 
All these examples point to a function of property that has yet to 
be fully theorized and analyzed,214 namely the role of property as 
flexibility.  This is a counterintuitive argument.  Because property 
often means attachment and connections,215 it seems implausible to 
associate it with flexibility and mobility.  Against the background of 
property as stability,216 access as a form of property use allows 
detachment and fluidity.  It is important to note, however, that access 
is not a typical property form: traditional property rights are secured 
by title.217  Even the non-formalist and progressive accounts that 
promote a more malleable understanding of property focus on 
 
 206  See Clarke, supra note 150. 
 207  Cf. id.; Eisner, supra note 177; Hayek, supra note 178. 
 208  Cf. Fennell, supra note 100, at 1051 (“[H]ouseholds that lack the financial 
wherewithal or risk tolerance to take on such a large investment simply cannot become 
homeowners.”). 
 209  Cf. Christopher L. Foote, Just the Facts: An Initial Analysis of Subprime’s Role in the 
Housing Crisis, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 291 (2008).  
 210  Emily Compton, Could Micro-Apartments Help Ease Austin’s Housing Crunch?, 
REPORTING TEX. (May 9, 2014), http://reportingtexas.com/could-micro-apartments-
help-ease-austins-housing-crunch/ (quoting a developer who declared that micro-unit 
residents have few belongings, “are part of the sharing economy,” and are “willing to 
have less space in order to live in a cool neighborhood and have access to the amenities 
of the city”).  See also Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, Sharing Economy as an 
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 211  Infranca, supra note 152. 
 212  Darcy Wintonyk & Lynda Steele, A 226 Sq. Ft. Solution to Living Large in 
Vancouver, CTV BRITISH COLUMBIA (Aug. 17, 2012), http://bc.ctvnews.ca/a-226-sq-ft-
solution-to-living-large-in-vancouver-1.917039 (“The city is your living room.  The city 
is your dining room.  You don’t need to use your own resources to recreate all that 
when you can just step out your door and enjoy a park, a beach, a restaurant, a café.”).  
 213  Bardhi et al., supra note 15. 
 214  See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99. 
 215  See supra Part I. 
 216  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4; Peñalver, Land Virtues, supra note 93. 
 217  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4.  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (describing an information 
cost theory of property). 
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attachment.218  Joseph William Singer, for example, supports 
recognizing informal property rights based on the reliance interest.219  
This vision of property as attachment to a place and a community is 
further explained in his work: 
Property gives us freedom and stability, provides a source of 
wealth and well-being, the bases for creative work and useful 
investment.  Property provides a place to create a family life, 
to nurture friendships, to rest, and to have fun.  Property 
allows us to be good neighbors and good citizens, and it 
promotes various human values, including privacy, the 
freedom to associate with others, religious liberty, tranquility, 
and peace of mind.220 
In order to decouple property from attachment, so ingrained in 
our legal thinking, one should direct attention to property use.  Access 
is an alternative form of use, and not of property rights.221  Once we 
accept use as the relevant prism for property as personhood, we can 
begin to unpack the important role of property without personhood. 
The role of flexibility is intricate.  It is not the same as freedom.222  
Flexibility derives from access as an alternative to ownership.  As such, 
it allows choice as opposed to stability.  Flexibility is not simply the 
ability to use a variety of assets.  The argument is not an essentialist 
view of consumer choices.223  People are not necessarily defined by 
their choice to access;224 the claim is more nuanced.  Flexibility 
concerns the detachment from property and the focus on use instead 
of continuing possession. 
The choice of detachment is a relational choice as well.  Property 
provides a place for social interaction with family and friends.225  A 
 
 218  See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura 
S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).  
 219  Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988); 
JOSEPH W. SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES (6th ed. 2014) 
(discussing informal sources of rights, reliance, social customs and norms).  See also 
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Informal Property Rights of Boomerang Children in the Home, 74 MD. 
L. REV. 127 (2014) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Boomerang Children]. 
 220  Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1054 (2009) [hereinafter Singer, Democratic Estates]. 
 221  Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, supra note 100. 
 222  On property as promoting freedom, see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009).  See also Larissa Katz, Ownership and Social Solidarity: A 
Kantian Perspective, 17 LEGAL THEORY 119 (2011). 
 223  On identity and consumption, see Alan Warde, Consumption, Identity-Formation 
and Uncertainty, 28 SOC. 877 (1994). 
 224  Cf. Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 16. 
 225  Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 220. 
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stable location is important for sustaining relationships.226  If property 
is less about personhood and stability, then ties might be looser.  Yet, 
access can support a broader spectrum of more casual networks.227 
Of course, one could argue that access can be classified as 
fungible property—as per Radin’s taxonomy—and therefore does not 
present a true challenge to contemporary property theory.228  However, 
according to Radin, both categories—fungible and personhood 
property—refer to property owned or leased for long periods.229  Even 
fungible property can evoke stability and security.230  More importantly, 
access is a choice that rejects at least partially the limiting function of 
property as personhood.  It represents resistance to traditional notions 
of property. 
Nonetheless, flexibility is not for everyone.  Young people, 
especially Gen-Yers, are more inclined toward property fluidity than 
previous generations.231  Not everyone is looking for mobility.  Access 
as a general lifestyle choice fits the unattached.  People with strong ties 
to the community, who have caretaking responsibilities, are likely to 
prefer stability.232  Nonetheless, more nuanced choices will fit a variety 
of people.  Flexibility with personal, as opposed to real, property might 
be more easily integrated into people’s lives.  At the end of the day, 
most people would prefer a mixture of personhood and flexibility, 
embracing both models of property use.233 
2. Critiques of Property without Personhood 
Access, or property without personhood, creates vulnerabilities.  
The Kantian notion of property focuses on independence both from 
other people and from the state.234  Access epitomizes the opposite: it 
 
 226  Kreiczer-Levy, Boomerang Children, supra note 219. 
 227  Id. 
 228  See Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 6, at 88.  
 229  Radin, supra note 1, at 960. 
 230  Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4 (discussing stability without limiting it to 
a particular type of property). 
 231  Piiparinen et al., supra note 179. 
 232  Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 220, at 1054 (explaining the pluralist values 
of property, including stability and community). 
 233  Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 26–27. 
 234  See Katz, supra note 222, at 126 (“For Kant, all private rights are derived from 
our basic right to independence, which for Kant means the capacity to set and pursue 
our own purposes, and so the freedom not to be subject to the choices of others.”); 
RIPSTEIN, supra note 222, at 91 (“[I]f someone interferes with your property, they 
thereby interfere with your purposiveness.”).  Others stress dependency or 
interdependency as a core feature of property.  See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES 
AND INSTITUTIONS 37–57 (2011); Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, Properties of 
Communities, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127 (2009).  Relational accounts insist that 
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is profoundly dependent.235  It is dependent on a pool of resources 
provided by owners, the state or the community.236  Some access-based 
enterprises rely on an online platform to mediate transactions.237  
These platforms gather information and might compromise privacy.238  
In addition, access as a way of life is risky.  Once the accessor becomes 
ill, old or in need of care, stability and long-term relations trump 
flexibility and mobility.239 
For this reason, access is mostly chosen as one component in an 
overall choice of property use.  It showcases the direction of new 
engagements with property, but it is unlikely to subsume the entire 
property project. 
A different critique is that access is never fully detached.  When 
people use an asset casually for a number of times, they become 
accustomed to it.240  They tend to prefer it, and ultimately get attached 
to this preferred possession.241  If one borrows her neighbor’s drill, she 
will be inclined to use it again provided she had a good experience.242  
If this is true, access will eventually morph into a more familiar form of 
property use that builds on ongoing attachment, yet lacks the security 
of formal ownership or a lease. 
Although complete flexibility and fluidity are perhaps 
unattainable,243 access provides the greatest potential for unattached 
 
property constructs relationships and does not just set boundaries.  Jennifer Nedelsky, 
Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1991). 
 235  Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 27. 
 236  Id.  
 237  Cf. Einat Albin, Required Intimacies: What Airbnb and Domestic Work Share 
in Common 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[I]ndeed, 
technological development has enabled the progression of online platforms that 
promote sharing and collaboration.”); Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, supra note 10.  
 238  See, e.g., Gabriel R. Schlabach, Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and the Stored 
Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677 (2015).  
 239  Cf. Martha Alberston Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable: Rethinking The Nature of 
Individual and Social Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 85 (2012) (“If someone is very 
young, profoundly ill or disabled, or very old, we may not be comfortable demanding 
they conform to the mandates of self-sufficiency and independence.”). 
 240  Chenchen Liao et al., The Roles of Habit and Web Site Quality in E-Commerce, 26 
INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 469 (2006) (noting that intentions of continued use depend on 
perceived usefulness, trust, and habit); Walter A. Woods, Psychological Dimensions of 
Consumer Behavior, 24 J. MARKETING 15 (1960) (discussing the force of habit in 
consumer choices). 
 241  This is especially true considering the costs of learning to use new possessions.  
See Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13, at 111. 
 242  Id.  It is costly to scout for new products whenever accessors decide to use 
property again (“‘[S]earch costs’ are created through the money or effort needed to 
determine which product to purchase or which sharing program to enter.”).  Id. 
 243  This is because of the human tendency to favor repetition.  Henk Aart et al., 
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property use.  Transitions and change are less complicated and easier 
with access, as compared with ownership or long-term possession.244  It 
also creates more potential for experimentation, depending on the 
personality of the accessor and his or her motivations for using access. 
Finally, the lack of attachment might mean disregard for the 
property, including lack of proper maintenance and neglect.245  In 
other words, if the property is not mine, I do not have sufficient 
incentives to care for it.  A study of Zipcar users supports this claim.246  
Yet unlike the access offered by business companies who own the 
property,247 communal access and peer-to-peer access create a reduced 
risk.  In lending libraries, people feel a commitment to take care of the 
property for the good of the community.248  In peer-to-peer markets, 
the reciprocal reputation system creates an incentive for cautious and 
attentive behavior.249 
To conclude, access provides an alternative property form that 
emphasizes flexibility and mobility.  This attribute has benefits and 
costs, but it ultimately represents a choice of being detached from 
property.  Alongside property as personhood, there is also reason to 
recognize property without personhood. 
 
Predicting Behavior From Actions in the Past: Repeated Decision Making or a Matter of Habit?, 
28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1355, 1355 (1998) (“When behavior is repeated and 
becomes habitual, it is guided by automated cognitive processes, rather than by 
elaborate decision processes.”).  
 244  See Cooter, supra note 97; Desan, supra note 98. 
 245  On physical damages to property, see Christian Witting, Physical Damage in 
Negligence, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189 (2002).  
 246  Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 889. 
 247  See id. at 891. 
 248  Lucie K. Ozanne & Julie L. Ozanne, A Child’s Right to Play: The Social Construction 
of Civic Virtues in Toy Libraries, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 264, 271 (2011) (“Very 
young children learn that the library toys are collective goods that need to be enjoyed 
while respecting the next user.”).  In addition, toy libraries sanction mistreatment of 
toys.  See KARIORI TOY LIBR., http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/borrowing (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2017) (collecting a $5 fine for all missing, lost, or destroyed pieces); see also BOX 
HILL AREA TOY LIBR., http://boxhillareatoylibrary.org.au/toys/borrowing/ (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2017) (charging a fine for broken or missing toys). 
 249  Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational 
Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem” (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2015), 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Thierer-Lemons-Problem.pdf.  See, e.g., 
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13/how-do-reviews-work (last visited 
June 30, 2016); TURO, https://turo.com/trust-and-safety (last visited June 30, 2016); 
NEIGHBORGOODS, http://neighborgoods.net/faq (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).  See also 
Eyal Ert et al., Trust and Reputation in the Sharing Economy: The Role of Personal Photos in 
Airbnb, 43 NA ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 518 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=26241 
81. 
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III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
There are three possible legal approaches to the property without 
personhood phenomenon: to reject flexibility as working against the 
public policy of stability in property; to reevaluate the property as 
personhood legal protection; or, to distinguish between the two 
categories while supporting both when appropriate.  This Part explains 
these possibilities and explores their merit. 
The first direction is to insist that stability and property are 
inseparably linked.  It is a governmental interest to foster stability, and 
property is one important means of achieving this goal.250  This is 
especially true regarding the homeownership debate.251  Homeowners, 
arguably the epitome of stability, view renters as failing to demonstrate 
community commitment.252  The connection of stability and 
commitment supports the view that flexibility is hazardous.  If 
flexibility as a characteristic of property threatens the notion of 
stability, then the law must limit the option to engage with property 
without personhood. 
Legally, such a position implies stringent regulation coupled with 
strong disincentives for access and access-like activities.  Regulation 
today encourages users to choose ownership or other forms of long-
term possession because there are strong disincentives working against 
 
 250  Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: a Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 
62, 66 (2004) (arguing that governments promote homeownership as creating stability 
in order to shift the burden of welfare to the family).  It has similarly been suggested 
that home ownership ideology promotes a property-based citizenship, privileging 
home ownership over public and rental housing.  See RICHARD RONALD, THE IDEOLOGY 
OF HOME OWNERSHIP: HOMEWORKER SOCIETIES AND THE ROLE OF HOUSING (2008).  See 
also Ann Dupuis & David C. Thorns, Home, home ownership security and the search for 
ontological security, 46 SOC. REV. 24 (1998) (arguing that the home is a site of constancy 
and ontological security). 
 251  Lynda Cheshire et al., The Politics of Housing Consumption: Renters as Flawed 
Consumers on a Master Planned Estate, 47 URB. STUD. 2597, 2598 (2010) (arguing that 
renters are seen as failing in three aspects of social life: “aesthetical conduct, ethical 
values and community commitment”).  
 252  Id. 
KREICZER-LEVY  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  3:27 PM 
2017] PROPERTY WITHOUT PERSONHOOD 801 
access.253  Examples include insurance policies,254 taxes,255 and business 
permits.256  This position supports such rules and would even advocate 
expanding this approach to more areas of regulation. 
The advantages of this approach are clear.  It preserves current 
understandings of the function of property, and supports stability, 
freedom and familial ties.257  However, it downplays the role of 
flexibility, mobility and change in property use, and their potential to 
promote autonomy for users.  More importantly, property without 
personhood creates an alternative to the traditional view of property.  
This alternative provides a prism for criticizing and reevaluating the 
stagnation that afflicts contemporary property visions. 
The second direction takes the opposite path.  If property as 
flexibility is a rising phenomenon, it could be taken to mean the 
demise of property as personhood.  Put differently, considering the 
popularity of access, one could argue that attachment is no longer 
 
 253  See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99. 
 254  Ingrid Ballús-Armet et al., Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Exploring Public Perception and 
Market Characteristics in the San Francisco Bay Area, California, 2416 J. TRANSP. RES. BOARD 
27, 28 (2014) (discussing how personal vehicle insurance policies are generally invalid 
when the owners give access to users, as this activity would count as commercial 
activity).  See also Ron Lieber, Share a Car, Risk Your Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/your-money/auto-insurance/enthusia 
stic-about-car-sharing-your-insurer-isnt.html?_r=0.  Jay MacDonald, Auto Insurance Risks 
of Car Sharing, BANKRATE (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insuran 
ce/auto-insurance-risks-car-sharing-1.aspx#ixzz3kxcDf3Da.  But see CAL. INS. CODE § 
11580.24 (West 2015) (“No private passenger motor vehicle insured by its owner 
pursuant to a policy of insurance subject to Section 11580.1 or 11580.2 shall be 
classified as a commercial vehicle, for-hire vehicle, permissive use vehicle, or livery 
solely because its owner allows it to be used for personal vehicle sharing . . . .”); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 742.595 (2015) (“An owner’s insurance policy for a private passenger 
motor vehicle may not be canceled, voided, terminated, rescinded or nonrenewed 
solely on the basis that the vehicle has been made available for personal vehicle sharing 
pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program that is in compliance with the 
provisions of ORS 742.585 to 742.600.”). 
 255  Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989 
(2016) (arguing there is no need for special taxation rules for the sharing economy, 
but conceding that it would be complicated for nonprofessionals, especially regarding 
cost deduction and apportionment of expenses).  See also Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking 
the sharing economy: An independent review, UK DEP’T OF BUS., INNOVATION & SKILL 21 
(2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-the-sharing-econ 
omy-independent-review (recommending “a guide to tax in the sharing economy, and 
an online tax calculator to help users of sharing economy services to easily work out 
how much tax they are liable to pay”).  
 256  Cf. Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-
Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1201–02 (2001) (noting the problem 
of home business).  
 257  See supra notes 213–219 and accompanying text. 
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important for human flourishing.258  The special treatment of 
personhood property should be scrutinized and reevaluated.  This 
direction finds support in previous studies questioning the validity of 
property as personhood.259  Legal protection of personhood property 
includes takings law,260 eviction rules,261 criminal law,262 and privacy in 
the home.263  In addition, property tax and bankruptcy rules protect 
personal-use property.264  According to this approach, all these rules 
will be reconsidered as the elevation of personhood property is 
 
 258  Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46, at 1106 (“Following Radin’s 
landmark article, a generation of legal scholars adopted the personhood perspective 
and focused in particular on the role of the home in human flourishing.”). 
 259  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 260  Following the case Kelo v. The City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)—that 
upheld a taking of a residential home for a private redevelopment project—several 
states enacted counter-legislation.  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(b) (requiring “acquiring 
by eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of conveying it to a 
private person” unless it is necessary for public health or safety reasons).  Indiana 
requires a 150% market value compensation for such a condemnation.  IND. CODE § 
32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (2008).  
 261  Just cause eviction rules serve to protect occupational rights of tenants in their 
home.  See, e.g., Symposium, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes 
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 534–35 (1984) (discussing common types of 
just-cause eviction statutes); Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: 
Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 833–35 (1983) (providing examples of 
“good cause” justifications for evictions and explaining their treatment). 
 262  See Barros, supra note 44, at 262 (noting that the punishment for invasion of a 
home generally exceeds the penalties “imposed for invasions of other types of 
property”).  In addition, the home as a castle doctrine provides that a person need not 
retreat if attacked at home.  People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914) (“It is not 
now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to 
retreat.  If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack.  He is under 
no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home. . . .  Flight 
is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home.”).  
 263  Stern, The Inviolate Home, supra note 44.  See also Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The 
Costs of the Fourth Amendment: Home Searches and Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2009). 
 264  2009 US MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE 9, 45–46 (Fred Conklin ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE], (describing how property tax law in most 
states distinguishes between personal property used for business purposes and 
property for personal use, and employs a personal property tax ad valorem but exempts 
personal use property, household goods or furniture).  See, e.g. id. at 10–39 (describing 
the situation in Delaware as including family bible, school books, family library, family 
pictures, pianos and sewing machines).  Yet, “[t]his provision shall not apply to persons 
who keep sewing machines for sale or hire.”  See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(c).  See 
also MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE at 10–19, 10–24 (Alabama and Alaska); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 651-121(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (discussing all necessary household 
furnishings, appliances, clothing and books that are used by the debtor and his family).  
Federal bankruptcy exemptions include a car, household furniture and goods, and 
books that are personally used.  See 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d) (LexisNexis 2016); JAMES J. 
BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT 10-1, 10-9 (Supp. 2010). 
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obsolete or unnecessary. 
The problem with this approach is that the mere existence of an 
alternative does not negate the role of property as personhood.  
Property without personhood points to one drawback of the 
personhood argument: its tendency towards stagnation and the 
possible restriction of identity.265  It does not support or undercut the 
theory on its merits, but suggests an alternative that fits certain people 
at different points in their lives. 
The third direction takes seriously both flexibility and stability as 
being part of a rich and nuanced property regime.  Property as 
personhood and property without personhood play different roles in 
promoting autonomy and flourishing.  Property law should recognize 
demographic differences and human diversity.  Three implications 
follow: protection of personal property depending on its actual 
contribution to self-development and personhood; reconsideration of 
regulative barriers to access; and evaluation of the institutional design 
supporting access. 
Without adopting property as personhood in full, this direction 
recognizes the centrality of attachment, personhood and stability in 
certain types of property.  As mentioned above, even passionate 
adopters of access still prefer to own certain types of property, most 
notably the home.266  The vision of the home as a special locus for 
individual autonomy and dignity,267 freedom and privacy,268 is relevant 
even in an age of access.  Moreover, the home is also important as a 
relational space hosting a variety of intimate interactions.269 
Nonetheless, the protection of personhood cannot undercut 
access.  A second important implication requires legal regulation to 
recognize access.270  The obstacles described earlier in tax, permit and 
insurance law need to be removed.271  This is not a call for immediate 
regulation.  In crafting rules, there are many relevant considerations, 
including positive and negative externalities.272  However, addressing 
 
 265  See supra Part I.B.4. 
 266  Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156, at 29 and accompanying text. 
 267  See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views 
of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2972 (2006).  
 268  Lisa M. Austin, Person, Place or Thing? Property and The Structuring of Social 
Relations, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 445, 450 (2010).  
 269  Kreiczer-Levy, Boomerang Children, supra note 219, at 138. 
 270  Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 32. 
 271  See supra notes 251–254 and accompanying text. 
 272  For example, effects on neighborhoods, the community, and the environment 
are key elements.  See, e.g., Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1579, 
1589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that preserving residential character and 
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these obstacles with the understanding of property as flexibility in 
mind is crucial. 
Access is a general category based on the consumer’s perspective 
that includes the experience of short-term and uncommitted use.273  
However, the property could be accessed in various institutional 
settings, each with its own merits and faults.  The owner of the property 
can be a commercial company, a private owner, the state or the 
community.  This Article offers a preliminary account that compares 
these different institutions according to their contribution to flexibility 
and mobility. 
There are four main institutional settings that provide assets or 
resources to be accessed by users: commercial companies, city or state-
supported services, community resources, and peer-to-peer markets.  
In the commercial company model, a user chooses a vehicle from a 
fleet of cars owned by the company.274  The transaction concerns 
commercial property and property designed for personal use.275  
Advantages include accessibility of vehicles,276 variety,277 a more 
regulated model, and the usual advantages of access such as saving 
storage costs and the costs of ownership.278  On the other hand, 
commercial access with regard to cars is characterized by a lack of 
reciprocity.279  There is no sense of community or commitment 
between users.280  Users typically neglect to fill gas tanks for the next 
user, and they sometimes smoke in the car.281  Bardhi and Eckhardt 
conclude that Zipcar does not conform to the vision of collaborative, 
 
community stability is a legitimate government interest in regulating the sharing 
economy); Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d 1083, 1084 (1993) (upholding a 
local ordinance and stating there is a legitimate government interest “in securing 
affordable housing for permanent residents and in preserving the character and 
integrity of residential neighborhoods”).  Cf. Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal 
Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 2–3 (2012). 
 273  See generally supra Part II. 
 274  See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886. 
 275  See Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 6, at 79 (“Because the owner 
in Zipcar is a commercial company, there is no consumption property involved in the 
transaction.  Their cars are business inventory par excellence.  In Turo, at least some 
of the vehicles available are personal cars rented out by individual owners when they 
are not using them.”).  
 276  See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886 (explaining that Zipcars are located 
close to a person’s residence or place of work). 
 277  Id. (“Zipcar has around 30 car models in its fleet, from basic functional models, 
such as Toyota trucks, to luxury brands such as BMW, to green cars such as the Toyota 
Prius.”). 
 278  Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13, at 111. 
 279  See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 891–92. 
 280  Id. 
 281  Id. 
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altruistic and sustainable consumption.282  There is a certain level of 
flexibility that comes from access to a fleet of cars spread out over many 
locations.283  However, companies usually tend to encourage a brand 
community and identification with specific cars.284  They attempt to 
foster attachment rather than flexibility. 
A different model relies on governmental or nonprofit oversight.  
Bike sharing is a good example.  Providers include governments, quasi-
governmental transport agencies, and universities.285  Paul DeMaio 
explains the benefits and costs of each provider.  In a governmental 
model, the local government operates the service and gains control 
over it, but it also maintains the liability and might be less 
experienced.286  In the transport agency model, there is a quasi-
governmental organization that provides services to the jurisdiction.287  
The jurisdiction benefits from the experience of the provider without 
bearing the costs.288  However, the provider is not subject to 
competition by other qualified operators.289  The university model 
expands intra-campus service without relying on outside sources.290  
However, the general population does not benefit from the service and 
there might be compatibility issues with the locality.291  The nonprofit 
model benefits the locality because it removes liability, yet this model 
often relies on the public sector for most of its funding.292 
The governmental model today is mostly notable for 
transportation services.293  If considered more broadly, the model 
benefits from an equal distribution of goods and services and overall 
public planning,294 but it also creates dependency on the state for 
supplying the property, and less flexibility.295 
 
 282  Id. at 894. 
 283  See ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2017); CAR2GO; www.car 
2go.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).  
 284  See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886, 888. 
 285  DeMaio, supra note 124, at 45. 
 286  Id.  
 287  Id. at 45–47. 
 288  Id. 
 289  Id. 
 290  Id. at 47.  
 291  DeMaio, supra note 124, at 47. 
 292  Id. 
 293  Id. at 45–47. 
 294  Cf. Mishori, supra note 112. 
 295  Cf. Reich, supra note 222, at 273.  As Charles Reich explains, “[t]he institution 
called property guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the 
state. . . .  [I]n a society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to control a 
particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuality.”  
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A community model operates as a common resource of members.  
Members pay membership fees296 and can use the resources as long as 
they follow specific borrowing rules, and in some cases perform 
responsibilities shared by members such as “assisting the librarian with 
issues and returns, helping new members and processing any new 
toys.”297  This model builds on detachment from the property and 
flexibility of use, but it also involves social involvement and 
participation.298  For this reason, access to property in the community 
model avoids the potential commodification of relationships that is 
sometimes associated with the peer-to-peer model.299 
In the peer-to-peer model, a private owner rents out his personal 
property to a user.  Both the owner and the user benefit from the 
excess capacity of the property.300  This model is often mediated by an 
online platform that significantly lowers transaction costs.301  Peer-to-
peer access combines a contract between the owner and the user, and 
the platform that facilitates the transaction and is responsible towards 
both owners and users.302  This model avoids the problem of negative 
reciprocity associated with commercial companies303 because it directly 
connects owners and users.304  Most platforms include a reputation 
mechanism that offers reviews not only for the owner and the property, 
but also for the accessor.305  In addition, such a model provides more 
flexibility because it offers a plethora of available options without 
promoting brand association or consumer loyalty to a specific 
company.306  However, these markets may replace neighborly assistance 
with monetary transactions,307 sparking a concern with regard to 
 
 296  Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19, at 488. 
 297  See, e.g., KARORI TOY LIBR., http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/belonging (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2017).  
 298  See Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19. 
 299  Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 41. 
 300  See Benkler, supra note 110.  See also Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra 
note 6. 
 301  Id. 
 302  See, e.g., RENTYTHING, https://www.rentything.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) 
(describing the role of owner, user and platform). 
 303  See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 891–92 and accompanying text. 
 304  See Ghose, supra note 123. 
 305  See supra note 248.  See also Rachel Botsman, The currency of the new economy is 
trust, TEDGLOBAL (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_
trust (discussing a case where the owner decided to get a cat to avoid a negative review 
concerning mice on the premises). 
 306  See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 893, for Zipcar’s attempts at brand 
association. 
 307  Cf. Paul Webley & Stephen E. G. Lea, The Partial Unacceptability of Money in 
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relationship commodification.308 
To sum up, the third direction for legal policy seeks a balance 
between access and ownership to provide both security and flexibility.  
Yet a property regime requires lawmakers to consider the institutional 
framework of access, to ensure that flexibility and mobility are 
achieved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Property as personhood has been incredibly influential in 
modern legal theory.  However, the changing demographics, 
globalization and the sharing economy have created an alternative 
form of property use.  Possession of property provides attachment, 
security and stability, but it is also limiting.  It constrains identity to a 
predetermined image.  Access as a form of property use represents 
property without personhood, which allows individuals to experiment 
and push the boundaries of their identity.  As this Article has argued, 
this alternative function of use has to be seriously considered by 
property theory.  This Article has explained the benefits and 
detriments of property without personhood and presented its 
theoretical significance. 
 
 
Repayment for Neighborly Help, 46 HUM. REL. 65 (1993). 
     308 Cf. Barry Wellman & Scot Wortley, Different Strokes from Different Folks: Community 
Ties and Social Support, 96 AM. J. SOC. 558 (1990) (addressing the services provided by 
physically accessible ties). 
